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In the space of a little more than twenty-four hours, during the second week of December 
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted two fundamental legal instruments: 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
1
 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2
 Both were proclaimed without a negative vote, 
although there were eight abstainers on 10 December when the Universal Declaration 
was adopted. At that time, René Cassin spoke of the Genocide Convention as a specific 
application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
3
 Much later, Alain Pellet 
described the Genocide Convention to the International Law Commission as ‘a 
quintessential human rights treaty’. 4  On the website of the United Nations Treaty 
Collection, the Genocide Convention appears under the rubric of ‘human rights’ where, 
as the first such instrument chronologically, it is at the top of the list.
5
 
The two texts seem closely related, although the negotiations of each took place 
more or less in parallel and in relative isolation from the other. Occasionally, diplomats in 
the General Assembly’s Third (Human Rights) Committee, where the Universal 
Declaration was being hammered out, remarked on the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention in the Sixth (Legal) Committee.
6
 Meanwhile, those who negotiated the 
Genocide Convention thought that attacks upon minority groups falling short of outright 
physical extermination were better addressed within the framework of the Declaration, 
where a broad provision upon minority rights was being considered. In the end, the Third 
Committee dropped the minority rights text, leaving a gap in the international legal 
framework of the United Nations that to some extent has never been properly filled.
7
 
Both Committees wrestled with the legacy of the Nuremberg trial. The negotiators 
of the Genocide Convention were conscious of the danger that the definition would be 
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too closely linked to the crimes against humanity formulation applied at the International 
Military Tribunal because this might then exclude international criminal liability for 
atrocities perpetrated in times of peace. Those working on the Universal Declaration 
contended with the general principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. Too rigid a 
formulation might suggest disapproval of the Nuremberg proceedings.  
Not everyone welcomed the potent synergy of the Universal Declaration and the 
Genocide Convention. Raphael Lemkin, who had invented the term ‘genocide’ in 1944 
and campaigned ardently for its codification, viewed the Universal Declaration as a 
dangerous distraction from what he considered to be the main task. Lemkin apparently 
also resented news coverage of the UN General Assembly referring to ‘two U.N. 
achievements’ that year.8 Hersch Lauterpacht dismissed the Universal Declaration as a 
relatively worthless exercise of no legal consequence. Lauterpacht was intensely 
disappointed that the General Assembly had failed to agree upon a full-blown human 
rights treaty that might then provide a real parallel to the corresponding Genocide 
Convention.
9
 
Much later, Benjamin Whitaker, who was special rapporteur of the UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, said 
genocide was ‘the ultimate human rights problem’.10 Each of the two instruments was 
seminal in its own field. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the foundation of 
all modern human rights treaties and to this day provides the core legal framework for 
mechanisms such as the Universal Periodic Review, undertaken by the United Nations 
Human Rights Council since 2008.
11
 The Genocide Convention also influenced the 
drafting of future international criminal law treaties. Perhaps more importantly, its 
acknowledgement of the international criminal court project in article 6 ultimately 
resulted, a half-century later, in the successful negotiation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
The two disciplines, human rights and international criminal law, are obviously 
associated in many ways besides their common ancestry, something which was certainly 
more than a mere coincidence. A simplistic attempt at distinguishing them might focus on 
the fact that international human rights law is addressed to the obligations of a State 
towards those subject to its jurisdiction whereas international criminal law targets 
individual perpetrators. Yet while human rights treaties are confined to the obligations of 
States, human rights law speaks to corporations and individuals as well. Article 29(1) of 
the Universal Declaration recalls that ‘[e]veryone has duties to the community in which 
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible’, underscoring the 
observation that the duty-bearers of human rights are not States alone.
12
 As for 
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international crimes, they are ‘committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced’, as the Nuremberg judgment famously declared.13 Not that the State is entirely 
absent, because it is inconceivable that genocide could take place without its 
involvement.
14
 The Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court state that 
genocide must be committed ‘in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct 
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction’,15 
implying if not explicitly requiring that criminal conduct be pursuant to a plan or policy 
of a State. In other words, although international human rights law seems directed mainly 
at the State, whereas international criminal law looks to the individual perpetrator, human 
rights law also applies to individuals and international criminal law requires some role for 
the State. 
Because they were both generated within the framework of the UN law-making 
process and couched under the normative umbrella of the Charter of the United Nations, 
a comfortable relationship between the Universal Declaration and the Genocide 
Convention may be presumed. They were adopted by the same legislator, of identical 
composition, within hours of each other, and with essentially the same unanimity. No 
similar remark can be made of another cognate, international humanitarian law, whose 
place within the United Nations system was actually disputed by members of the 
International Law Commission at its first sessions.
16
 
Several international treaties might be described as belonging both to human 
rights and international criminal law. A number of major United Nations conventions that 
arguably belong under the rubric of international criminal law, because they impose 
obligations to prosecute with respect to apartheid, torture and enforced disappearances, 
all reference the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration in their preambles.
17
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, on the other hand, rather 
studiously avoids too close an association with international human rights law. Its 
preamble cites the Charter of the United Nations but not the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
 
I. IMPUNITY AND THE OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE 
In the decades that followed 1948, the human rights systems and international criminal 
law evolved in parallel, with some notable exceptions such as the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid adopted in 
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1973. The Convention tackled the quintessential human rights challenge of the time with 
a package of obligations involving individual criminal responsibility and a duty upon 
States to prosecute offenders. The General Assembly’s Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted in 1975, combined classic human rights obligations to 
prevent torture with a duty to ‘ensure that all acts of torture as defined in article 1 are 
offences under its criminal law’.18 
This was not an easy link to make for many in the human rights movement who 
had traditionally viewed the criminal justice system with diffidence and suspicion. The 
focus was on violations of the right to a fair trial and on abuses of detention regimes. 
Success was marked by acquittals, successful appeals and release from prison. It was 
hardly accidental that one of the first great human rights non-governmental organizations, 
Amnesty International, chose to identify itself with ‘amnesty’, something that today 
seems inconceivable. Certainly the link between criminal justice and the protection of 
human rights had always been implicit. For example, it was trite to affirm that the right to 
life was protected by the criminalization of murder. But it took a number of decades for 
the human rights movement to see criminal law as a tool for the protection of vulnerable 
groups and individuals and not just as an instrument used by repressive regimes. 
This development became more pronounced in the 1980s when experts in bodies 
like the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities began to use terms like ‘impunity’ and ‘accountability’, and to focus on justice 
for victims of human rights violations.
19
 International human rights tribunals made 
innovative pronouncements about the rights of victims to have crimes investigated and 
prosecuted.
20
 Meanwhile, the UN International Law Commission, which was struggling 
to complete the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, on which it 
had begun work some forty years earlier, decided to abandon entirely the notion of 
crimes against humanity in favour of ‘[s]ystematic or mass violations of human rights’.21 
These developments were also reflected in the adoption, by international human rights 
organizations, of international criminal justice as an important area of activity. In 1998, 
Amnesty International played an instrumental role in attempts to prosecute former 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Human rights is a broad church, of course, and there 
are many who, while they accept the importance of accountability, prefer softer 
alternatives to criminal justice such as truth and reconciliation commissions and similar 
mechanisms. 
The normative justification for the engagement of international human rights law 
with international criminal justice and its institutions appears to be largely rooted in the 
entitlement of victims to justice and accountability. However, international criminal law 
is not concerned with all victims of violent crime. Its remit, as defined by treaty and 
customary international law, is almost entirely confined to widespread and systematic 
                                                        
18
 UNGA Res 3452 (XXX) (9 December 1975), art. 7. 
19
 ‘Preliminary report submitted by Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, Study concerning the right to 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ (“Preliminary report”) (26 July 1990) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10. 
20
 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 4 
(29 July 1988,). 
21
 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session’ (29 April – 19 
July 1991) UN Doc. A/46/10, p. 96. 
  
violations perpetrated in association with a State or State-like entity. Sovereign States 
would surely resist any attempt to expand the internationalization of criminal justice so as 
to encompass all forms of violent crime. Yet from the standpoint of the victim of a 
violation of fundamental rights, can there be a reasonable distinction resulting from the 
context of a crime so that a woman who is raped finds an entitlement to international 
criminal justice only if the violence can be described as part of a larger attack amounting 
to crimes against humanity? 
In recent years, international human rights law has taken the view that there is 
indeed a duty upon States to see that all serious crimes against the person are investigated 
and prosecuted.
22
 In other words, from the standpoint of international human rights law 
and the entitlement of victims it does not appear to make much of a difference whether 
the violence results from an organized State-led attack or is the result of an isolated, 
opportunistic social deviant. Nevertheless, the obligation upon States imposed by human 
rights law to investigate and prosecute serious crimes appears to be confined to acts 
perpetrated within their jurisdiction unless the acts are associated with the contextual 
elements of international crimes and are therefore subject to universal jurisdiction. This 
inequality of treatment is not a simple thing to explain to victims. Taken from the 
standpoint of international human rights law alone, it is an incoherent result. Such 
incoherence is perhaps the inevitable consequence of uneven evolution within the two 
fields, human rights and international criminal law. 
Confusion creeps in because of a tendency to blur the applicable principles. For 
example, the argument developed within international human rights law by which 
amnesty for serious crimes is deemed unacceptable, relies upon the recognition of the 
rights of victims to justice.
23
 Yet it is also said that prohibition of amnesty is confined to 
international crimes or so-called jus cogens violations. But why, if victims of human 
rights violations are entitled to justice, should it make any difference whether the crime 
meets the international definition? If amnesty is prohibited for jus cogens crimes, such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, why is it not also ruled out for murder 
and rape? This is where the complementarity and even synergy between human rights 
and international criminal law appears to stumble. 
 
II. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
NORMS 
 
Many crimes fall within the ambit of international criminal law. Not all of them bear an 
obvious relation to the protection and promotion of human rights. A century ago, 
international law recognized obligations to punish and repress, and the possibility of the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, to offences such as piracy, trafficking in pornography 
and counterfeit currency, and disrupting undersea telecommunications cables. Such 
crimes were designated ‘international’ because challenges to their repression required 
international cooperation and agreement on jurisdictional matters. These were not crimes 
about which it could be said that they ‘shocked the conscience of humanity’. 
With the end of the Second World War, a new generation of international crimes 
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was recognized whose common denominator was contiguous with the protection of 
human rights. Raphael Lemkin recognized this in the draft resolution on genocide he 
prepared for the UN General Assembly in October 1946:  
 
Whereas the punishment of the very serious crime of genocide when committed in 
time of peace lies within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the judiciary of 
every State concerned, while crimes of a relatively lesser importance such as 
piracy, trade in women, children, drugs, obscene publications are declared as 
international crimes and have been made matters of international concern...
24
  
 
In the past, crimes had been internationalized in order to facilitate arrest and prosecution 
of international outlaws, like pirates, who were the enemies of all States: hostis humani 
generis, as Grotius called them.
25
 The newer international crimes were being 
internationalized precisely because they were committed by States or with their 
complicity. Perpetrators went unpunished not because they could hide on the high seas 
but because they were protected by States and were indeed the implements of ruthless 
policies directed against civilian populations. 
By the end of the 1940s, three broad categories of international crime were 
recognized: genocide, as defined in article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention; crimes 
against humanity, according to article VI(c) of the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal; 
and war crimes, set out in article VI(b) of the Charter as well as in the grave breach 
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Later, with the continuous enrichment of 
international human rights norms, criminalization was associated with other violations 
that became stand-alone categories of crimes against humanity, notably apartheid, torture 
and enforced disappearance. War crimes evolved away from battlefield offences 
involving combatants who had broken the rules of lawful killing towards a body of law 
targeted at the protection of civilians, in occupied territories for international armed 
conflict and within the territories of the concerned State for non-international armed 
conflict. With confirmation that war crimes could be perpetrated in non-international 
armed conflict, a consequence of the judicial law-making of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
26
 and something later confirmed in article 8 of the 
Rome Statute, war crimes became relatively indistinguishable from serious violations of 
human rights. 
Some tension remains in the relationship between human rights and international 
criminal law with respect to the latter’s subject matter.27 At the Rome Conference, some 
delegations campaigned for the recognition of international drug trafficking, terrorism, 
and the crime of aggression as categories of offences that belonged within the jurisdiction 
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of the International Criminal Court.
28
 Drug trafficking clearly seems closer to the first 
generation of international crime to which Lemkin referred in his draft 1946 General 
Assembly resolution. Terrorism is in more of a grey area, with lingering controversy 
about its place within the protection and promotion of human rights. Like most crimes, it 
has its innocent victims, and they may contend that fundamental rights have been 
breached. However, like pirates and those who tamper with undersea cables, terrorists are 
generally the enemies of humanity. A system of international treaties addressed to the 
repression of terrorist crimes has little to do with the protection of human rights. Indeed, 
the ‘war on terror’ is often more a source of violations of human rights than a means to 
their protection.
29
 
Given a lack of consensus at the Rome Conference with respect to both terrorism 
and drug crimes, the matter of their inclusion in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court was left to a subsequent Review Conference.
30
 But little changed when these 
crimes returned to the agenda in preparation for the 2010 Kampala Review Conference, 
and it was decided not to address them. The central project of the Kampala Conference 
was the incorporation of provisions concerning the crime of aggression. 
 
III. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
In 1941, at the dawn of the modern human rights movement, Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke 
of the ‘four freedoms’.31 His succinct formulation is repeated in the preambles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two Covenants: ‘freedom of speech and 
belief and freedom from fear and want’.  But although freedom of speech, belief and 
want resonate through precise provisions of those instruments, the place of freedom from 
fear within human rights law has not been as clear. Roosevelt’s message was that we 
have a right to live in a secure, peaceful environment. Article 28 of the Universal 
Declaration comes closest to recognizing this: ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized.’ When linked with the prohibition of aggressive war, there is a potent 
synergy between human rights and international criminal law. 
Even in international criminal law, the place of the crime of aggression has not 
always been as secure as that of the other categories of crimes where the human rights 
pedigree is more clearly evident. Thus, although crimes against peace were prosecuted at 
Nuremberg (described by the judges as ‘the supreme international crime’),32 they were 
remarkably absent when the UN Security Council established the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. At the 1998 Rome Conference, there was insufficient 
consensus on the subject, not so much a result of difficulties of definition as of 
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reconciling exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression with an alleged monopoly 
on the topic attributed to the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations. The 
matter was postponed until the first Review Conference, which was held in 2010. A 
package of amendments was adopted by consensus that should enter into force in 2017.
33
 
The major international human rights NGOs, generally highly devoted to the 
creation and work of the International Criminal Court, were surprisingly indifferent to the 
issue of the crime of aggression. Amnesty International said it had not: 
 
…taken a position on the definition of the crime of aggression because its 
mandate – to campaign for every person to enjoy all of the human rights (civil and 
political and economic, social and cultural rights) enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards - 
does not extend to the lawfulness of the use of force.
34
  
 
Human Rights Watch took a more pragmatic, policy-oriented view:  
 
Human Rights Watch’s institutional mandate includes a position of strict 
neutrality on issues of jus ad bellum, because we find it the best way to focus on 
the conduct of war, or jus in bello, and thereby to promote our primary goal of 
encouraging all parties to a conflict to respect international humanitarian law. 
Consistent with this approach, we take no position on the substance of a definition 
of the crime of aggression.
35
 
 
In a footnote to its explanation, Human Rights Watch added: ‘The only exceptions that 
Human Rights Watch has made to this policy is to call for military intervention where 
massive loss of human life, on the order of genocide, can be halted through no other 
means, as was the case in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s.’36 
The footnote in the Human Rights Watch statement may provide a useful clue to 
understanding some of the reticence in this area. A militaristic tendency has crept into 
human rights discourse in recent years, encouraged by talk of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
and the ‘responsibility to protect’. Of course, human rights law has never been pacifistic, 
in the sense of a principled and intransigent opposition to the use of force under all 
circumstances. The preamble of the Universal Declaration says that human rights must be 
protected by the rule of law so that ‘man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression’. But there has been a growing 
willingness to contemplate military interventions as the ultimate solution to serious 
human rights violations. In these discussions, it seems that an appeal to US military 
intervention (or, often, an ex post facto rationalization), albeit framed in reluctant 
language, is rarely very distant. 
                                                        
33
 ICC, The Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6 (11 June 2010). 
34
 Amnesty International, ‘International Criminal Court: Concerns at the seventh session of the Assembly 
of States Parties’ (2008) Index: IOR 40/022/2008, p. 22. 
35 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Memorandum for the Sixth Session of the International Criminal Court Assembly 
of States Parties’ (2007), p. 13. 
36
 ibid. 
  
Another influence may be the debates about the relationship between peace and 
justice in the context of prosecutorial strategy at the International Criminal Court. In 
situations where there is an arguable case that peace negotiations may be jeopardized by 
prosecution, such as northern Uganda and even Darfur, there has been political pressure 
on the International Criminal Court from bodies like the African Union to back off in 
respect for the interests of promoting peace. Encouraged by human rights NGOs, the 
Prosecutor of the Court has taken the view that the quest for peace should not condition 
his decisions about selection of situations and cases. In a policy paper issued in 
September 2007, the Prosecutor cited paragraph 3 of the preamble to the Rome Statute 
(‘Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world’), noting that ‘[t]he ICC was created on the premise that justice is an essential 
component of a stable peace’.37 He wrote that ‘there is a difference between the concepts 
of the interests of justice and the interests of peace and that the latter falls within the 
mandate of institutions other than the Office of the Prosecutor’. Furthermore, ‘the broader 
matter of international peace and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it 
falls within the mandate of other institutions’.38 
Yet there is also much to be said for the view that the rationale of the International 
Criminal Court is to promote peace, just as it was for the ad hoc tribunals. The latter were, 
after all, created by the UN Security Council in pursuit of its mandate to promote 
international peace and security, with Chapter VII of the Charter invoked in support. 
According to the first annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia: [I]t would be wrong to assume that the Tribunal is based on the old maxim 
fiat justitia et pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world were to perish). The 
Tribunal is, rather, based on the maxim propounded by Hegel in 1821: fiat justitia ne 
pereat mundus (let justice be done lest the world should perish). Indeed, the judicial 
process aims at averting the exacerbation and aggravation of conflict and tension, thereby 
contributing, albeit gradually, to a lasting peace.
39
 These words suggest that the pursuit of 
peace lies at the heart of international justice.  
The danger that the crime of aggression directs human rights and international 
criminal law in different directions, as it appeared to do at the Kampala Conference, 
which can be averted through greater attention to the underdeveloped role of peace within 
human rights discourse. It is certainly unfortunate that the Universal Declaration does not 
affirm a right to peace expressly. Perhaps that is because the drafters viewed human 
rights and the quest for peace as being inextricably linked, but considered peace to be a 
condition for the attainment of human rights rather than a right requiring precise 
enumeration and definition. The initial 48-article draft of the Declaration prepared by 
John Humphrey of the UN Secretariat began by noting that the preamble would refer to 
the four freedoms and was to start by stating the principle that ‘that there can be no peace 
unless human rights and freedoms are respected’.40 
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The first sentence of the preamble to the Universal Declaration reads: ‘Whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world…’ The 
immortal four freedoms of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which include ‘freedom from fear’, are 
cited, as Humphrey initially planned. The preamble also says that ‘it is essential to 
promote the development of friendly relations between nations’. Article 26 declares that 
education is to ‘further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace’.  
There is also a structural argument. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is an emanation of the Charter of the United Nations. Originally, the Charter was to have 
included a ‘bill of rights’. That would have left no doubt about the link between peace 
and human rights. To the disappointment of many States, delegates to the San Francisco 
Conference could not agree on how to incorporate a catalogue of fundamental rights in 
the Charter itself. They settled on general references to human rights in several provisions 
of the Charter, notably articles 1 and 55, as well as the preamble, leaving the work of 
codification to the Commission on Human Rights in accordance with article 68. That 
mandate was fulfilled on 10 December 1948 with the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. To contend that the Universal Declaration is somehow 
neutral on the issue of aggressive war is to dissociate that document from the context of 
its adoption and its place within the post-war legal order, which is founded on the 
prohibition of recourse to force to settle international disputes. 
There is much support for the concept of a ‘peoples’ right to peace’. For example, 
this is recognized by the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in 1981 
(‘All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security’). In 
1984 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled ‘The Peoples’ Right to 
Peace’. The text proclaimed that ‘the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace’ 
and that ‘the preservation of the right of peoples to peace and the promotion of its 
implementation constitute a fundamental obligation of each state’.41 There was a series of 
resolutions in the Commission on Human Rights
42
 and in the General Assembly
43
 and the 
matter has been taken up again within the Human Rights Council.
44
 The word ‘peoples’ 
has been dropped and it has become, simply, the ‘right to peace’ for which a UN 
declaration is currently being prepared.
45
 There is a North-South divide on this issue, 
with Western States decidedly unfriendly to such initiatives, perhaps because they see 
this as an encroachment upon the prerogatives of the Security Council. The right to peace 
provides a unifying principle that assists in uniting human rights and international 
criminal law, as well as the other cognate, international humanitarian law. The right to 
peace has strong potential to assist in putting other rights into perspective. 
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IV. NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE 
 
The most direct bridge between international human rights instruments and international 
criminal law relates to the issue of retroactive criminal prosecution. Article 15(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (there is a similar provision in the 
European Convention on Human Rights) provides:  
 
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of 
nations. 
 
The purpose was to ensure that the general prohibition of retroactive criminality did not 
cast any aspersions on the Nuremberg judgment and that of other post-war 
prosecutions.
46
 It seems that some members of the Commission on Human Rights were 
concerned that the text of article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
inadequate in this respect.
47
 
Retroactivity is an issue that has obsessed international criminal justice since its 
earliest days. At the international criminal tribunals, this has been a source of unceasing 
controversy. With the adoption of the Rome Statute and the development of an 
international criminal justice regime whose application promises to be universal, the issue 
of retroactive punishment ought to be largely laid to rest. The principle of nullum crimen 
is set out in article 23 of the Rome Statute, but this hardly seems necessary because the 
International Criminal Court can only exercise jurisdiction over crimes defined in its own 
texts on a prospective basis, that is, for crimes perpetrated after the Statute has entered 
into force. Indeed, in the initial cases before the Court, the issue has hardly arisen, in 
contrast with the experience at all of the earlier international criminal tribunals. 
But arguments about retroactive prosecution persist at both the judicial and 
political levels. The development of international criminal law is accompanied by 
constant attempts to reassess the past. Although human longevity makes prosecution for 
many offences that occurred years ago increasingly unlikely, because the perpetrators 
continue to die off or become unfit to stand trial, many difficulties remain. In 2008 
Spanish prosecutor Baltazar Garzón launched an investigation into the crime against 
humanity of enforced disappearance committed in the years immediately following the 
Spanish Civil War, raising questions as to whether international law applicable in the 
early 1940s recognized that crimes against humanity could be committed in peacetime. 
The same point has arisen recently with respect to trials concerning post-Second World 
War atrocities in the Baltic States, and the acts of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during 
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the 1970s. An important decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Kononov v. Latvia of 17 May 2010, ruled favourably upon the legality of a trial 
held in the 1990s of a pro-Soviet partisan for the summary execution of Nazi 
sympathizers at the height of the Second World War.
48
 
There is a lingering unease about retroactivity at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. 
According to the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, ‘it is to be observed 
that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in 
general a principle of justice’.49 The French version of the judgment is more qualified: 
‘[n]ullum crimen sine lege ne limite pas la souveraineté des États; elle ne formule qu’une 
règle généralement suivie’. The judgment continues: 
 
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who have in defiance of treaties and 
assurances attacked neighbouring States without warning is obviously untrue, for 
in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far 
from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed 
to go unpunished . . . [The Nazi leaders] must have known that they were acting in 
defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they carried out 
their designs of invasion and aggression.
50
 
 
In other words, the Tribunal admitted that there was a whiff of retroactivity to 
prosecution for crimes against peace, but said leaving such wrongs unpunished would be 
unjust. The nullum crimen rule was thus a relative one, subject to exception in light of 
circumstances. With respect to war crimes, the Tribunal was able to point to some 
precedent supporting international prohibition of certain behaviour, including the Hague 
Convention of 1907. 
In place of the rather flexible approach at Nuremberg, and perhaps somewhat in 
reaction to it, international human rights law proposes a seemingly intransigent 
prohibition of retroactive prosecution unless it can be shown that the crime existed under 
national or international law. The norm is deemed to be non-derogable and, for this 
reason, it has sometimes been classified among the noyau dur of human rights. Yet in 
practice, human rights tribunals have often manifested the same malleable approach to 
nullum crimen that was adopted by the International Military Tribunal and that was 
endorsed by the likes of Hans Kelsen, B.V.A. Röling, and Hersch Lauterpacht. They have 
tended to reject the militant positivism proposed by the Nuremberg defendants. 
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has held that uncodified 
crimes may be prosecuted providing they are sufficiently foreseeable and accessible. This 
is not really all that different from the remarks of the war crimes tribunal, cited above: 
‘the accused knew or should have known that in matters of international concern he was 
guilty of participation in a nationally organized system of injustice and persecution 
shocking to the moral sense of mankind’. It is an approach that might seem to lean to a 
natural law approach, in its fealty to morality as a basis for human conduct. 
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Cases from the United Kingdom dealing not with international crimes but with the 
ordinary crime of ‘spousal rape’ provide important authority here.51 This concept had not 
traditionally been part of the common law, which defined the crime of rape as an act 
perpetrated by a man against a woman other than his wife. In the 1980s common law 
judges in England started to find defendants guilty of raping their wives. The convicted 
men petitioned the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the law had been 
changed without them being properly informed. The Court dismissed the applications, 
saying the criminal prohibition of rape, even with respect to a spouse, was both 
foreseeable and accessible. The Court was persuaded in its opinion by the fact that the 
crime in question was offensive to ‘human dignity and human freedom’.52 In other words, 
it might well have applied the non-retroactivity rule in a stricter fashion had the case 
concerned a more technical or administrative offence that did not engage core values. 
The liberal approach to nullum crimen taken by the European Court of Human 
Rights appears to have influenced judges at the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. In 
one of the more detailed treatments of this issue, a Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was asked to declare that the concept of 
superior responsibility as a mode of liability amounted to retroactive law. The Trial 
Chamber turned to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, noting that 
article 7 of the Convention ‘allows for the “gradual clarification” of the rules of criminal 
liability through judicial interpretation’ 53  It said that it was ‘not necessary that the 
elements of an offence are defined, but rather that general description of the prohibited 
conduct be provided’,54 citing in support several rulings of the European Court, including 
one of the spousal rape decisions, which it quoted in extenso. Subsequently, the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone relied upon this passage in its discussion 
of nullum crimen in the child soldiers case.
55
 
A year after the Hadžihasanović jurisdictional motion, the Appeals Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia invoked the words of the 
International Military Tribunal to the effect that nullum crimen was ‘first and foremost a 
“principle of justice”’. Also citing the spousal rape cases of the European Court, the 
Appeals Chamber said: 
 
This fundamental principle [nullum crimen] ‘does not prevent a court from 
interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime’. Nor does it 
preclude the progressive development of the law by the court. But it does prevent 
a court from creating new law or from interpreting existing law beyond the 
reasonable limits of acceptable clarification. This Tribunal must therefore be 
satisfied that the crime or the form of liability with which an accused is charged 
was sufficiently foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability must be 
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sufficiently accessible at the relevant time, taking into account the specificity of 
international law when making that assessment.
56
 
 
The Appeals Chamber referred again to the European Court’s position that the concepts 
of ‘foreseeability’ and ‘accessibility’ of a norm will greatly depend on ‘the content of the 
instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to 
whom it is addressed’. On the specificity of international criminal law, the Appeals 
Chamber returned to Nuremberg, and the the Alstötter case, explaining the difficulties of 
applying the ex post facto rule to such prosecutions.
57
 
 
V. RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND REPARATIONS 
 
One of the most concrete manifestations of the influence of human rights discourse on 
international criminal law is in the area of reparations for victims. As early as 1989, the 
UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities prepared a report on the ‘restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights’.58 The language was taken up in article 75(1) 
of the Rome Statute, which is entitled ‘Reparations for victims’:  
 
The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect 
of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.  On this 
basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion 
in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which 
it is acting.  
 
The Rome Statute envisages that orders of reparation be made against convicted persons. 
When the Statute was adopted, there was a widely held view that the Court would 
prosecute warlords and tyrants who had stashed unimaginable sums of money in Swiss 
bank accounts. But experience as the ad hoc tribunals has shown that virtually all 
defendants are sufficiently indigent as to qualify for legal aid. The Trial Chamber hearing 
the first case at the International Criminal Court considered that it was ‘inappropriate to 
impose a fine in addition to the prison term, given the financial situation of Mr Lubanga. 
Despite extensive enquiries by the Court, no relevant funds have been identified.’59 
Alternatively, reparations may be paid out of the Trust Fund for Victims, 
established pursuant to article 79 of the Rome Statute. Located within the Part of the 
Statute dealing with penalties, it was conceived of in the Statute as a repository for 
‘money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture’. To date, it has received 
a small income in the form of voluntary contributions from States parties and a few 
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individuals. The operating costs of the Fund are charged to the general budget of the 
Court. This makes it less easy to see that if the operating costs were subtracted from its 
income, the Fund would be bankrupt. There will probably be much acclaim when the 
Court makes its first orders of reparation to victims drawn from the Trust Fund. It is 
doubtful, however, if this is really the best (and most cost-effective) way to address the 
issue of reparation and compensation for victims. An important part of assessing the 
relationship between human rights and criminal law is appreciating the limits of both 
sectors. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This short essay has not endeavoured to present a comprehensive overview of the 
relationship between international criminal law and human rights. Rather, it has proposed 
a discussion of some of the nodal points, where the two disciplines intersect and interact, 
not always without a degree of friction. Perhaps the most obvious relationship of all, 
which is the application of fair trial norms drawn from human rights law to the work of 
the international criminal tribunals, has been eschewed. In one sense this is a huge topic, 
and its omission might be deemed an unpardonable gap in any discussion. In reality, the 
procedural fairness discussion sheds little light on the relationship between human rights 
and international criminal law. The principles and norms are broadly similar to those 
applicable to national justice systems, with slight distinctions. There are shocking 
violations of fair trial standards accepted at the domestic level in the cases before the 
international criminal tribunals. Probably the most notorious problem is the right to trial 
without unreasonable delay. The first trial at the International Criminal Court took more 
than six years from arrest to sentence.
60
 At the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, two accused men spent twelve years in detention before and during their trial 
before eventually being acquitted. The hearing concluded in December 2008 but the 
judgment was not issued until September 2011. The two innocent men remained in 
detention for thirty-two months while the judges drafted a verdict declaring them to be 
not guilty. In the final judgment, they dismissed arguments that fundamental rights had 
been violated, holding ‘that a delay of 12 years from arrest to judgment does not, per se, 
constitute undue delay for the purposes of the Statute’.61 
International criminal law and human rights both emerged from the crucible of the 
Second World War. Profound changes were underway in the world order as the hitherto 
impenetrable wall of sovereignty began to give way to certain fundamental human 
values. The two strands came together in December 1948 when the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Several 
decades of parallel and uneven development were to follow. The revival of international 
criminal justice in the 1990s was very much a consequence of progress within the human 
rights movement, by that time increasingly attentive to issues of victims, accountability 
and impunity. 
A final observation of a more personal nature: There is an extraordinary cross-
fertilization of individual professionals who move back and forth across the divide 
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between human rights and international criminal law. Many of the greatest judges at the 
international tribunals were distinguished veterans of human rights institutions, including 
Antonio Cassese, Theodor Meron, Fausto Pocar and Stefan Trechsel. Moving in the other 
direction, the last two UN High Commissioners for Human Rights came to the position 
from distinguished careers in international criminal justice: Louise Arbour had been 
Prosecutor at the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Navi Pillay had been a 
judge at the International Criminal Court and the Rwanda Tribunal, where she served as 
President for a term. Perhaps nothing better illustrates the close bonds between these two 
fields. 
 
